

Ideology and Leadership in the DPRK since 1994

North Korean Society

February 19, 2019

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Monolithic ideology

- ❖ Yuil sasang 유일사상
 - ❖ Scam to hide Kim family rule?
 - ❖ Quasi-religion believed by the population?
- ❖ Armstrong
 - ❖ Individual and collective behavior is justified (in retrospect) by ideology
 - ❖ Evolution over time
 - ❖ Marxism-Leninism (1940s and 1950s)→chuch'e sasang (1960's and 1970s)→sŏn'gun chŏngch'i (1990s)

Chuch'e Sasang

- ❖ 1970s human-centered ideology
 - ❖ Marxism-Leninism creatively applied to Korea
 - ❖ Human centered because man has free will and ideology creates reality
 - ❖ Independence (chaju)
 - ❖ Gradually became Kim-family centered
- ❖ Marxism-Leninism dropped from KWP in 1980, and the constitution in 1992
- ❖ 1990s “our style socialism” 우리식 사회주의
 - ❖ Chuch'e fundamental but means not “autarky” but
 - ❖ Political self-determination
 - ❖ Freedom from outside control, or infection by outside influences
- ❖ Under Kim Jong Il “military first” became a militarized version of Juche
- ❖ Weakness of the system requires use of normative “symbolic-ideological” means of control
 - ❖ Weak efficiency, weak in dependence on unreliable local actors, weak in internalization of official ideology (Verdery)

Analysis of Chuch'e

- ❖ Marxism-Leninism Base (class analysis)
- ❖ Confucian/Buddhist elements
 - ❖ Whole (nation) is more important than any part (person)—nation is like a family written large with the leader the father of the country
 - ❖ Not materialist (material conditions generate thought)
 - ❖ Proper thought leads to proper conduct in social and economic relations
 - ❖ Ritual inculcates proper thought in the people
 - ❖ Laws can be used to mold people (rather than create a level playing field)

Our Style Socialism

- ❖ Inseparable from leadership of the Kims
- ❖ National independence and autonomy the most important values
- ❖ Proper ideology ensures the victory of socialism
- ❖ 1994 shift from politics of patriarchy to that of filial piety?
- ❖ Shift to linking Kims to ancestral Korean rulers rather than communism (Tan'gun, Chumong, King Tongmyǒng)
- ❖ Country as family with the Kims as fathers
 - ❖ Sǒnbae-hubae relationship fundamental, and hyoja idealized

Kim Il Sung's Death

- ❖ 1994.7.8 KIS dies
 - ❖ 10 day mourning period until July 19th funeral announced, but KJI delayed it until the 20th
 - ❖ KIS's body placed in Kŭmsusan Palace "sadang" (ancestral hall)
 - ❖ 1997 Moranbong shrine erected for "ch'umo" (like taesang)
 - ❖ Kŭmsusan Palace becomes "Kŭmsuan Sun Palace" 금수산 태양 궁전
 - ❖ April 15th declared "Sun Days" 태양절
 - ❖ Dating Change to Chuch'e 1 (1912 year 1)
- ❖ Kim Jong Il waits for three years to take father's titles

Kūmsusan Memorial Palace



Moranbong Statues



Military First

- ❖ Terms for the leader
 - ❖ 김정일=원수, 대원수, 최고사령관, 장군님
- ❖ After Kim Il Sung's death in 1994 sŏn'gun more common, until enshrined in 1998 constitution
 - ❖ Rhetoric of “Great and Prosperous Country” begins
강성대국,
- ❖ “barracks communism”

DPRK 1998 Constitution

- ❖ **Kim Il Sŏng** “eternal President” 영원한 주석
- ❖ **Supreme Peoples Assembly** 최고인민회의 is the “highest organ of state power” (¶87). Elected every 5 years but sessions are short. It basically legislates to ratify what has already been decided elsewhere. Elects chair of DPRK National Defense Commission and President of Presidium, Cabinet, Procurator General and Chief Justice.
- ❖ **Presidium** or *Standing Committee of the SPA* 최고인민회의 상임위원회 “highest organ of power in the intervals between sessions of the SPA”. Makes and disposes of ministries, and supervises state plans.
- ❖ **Cabinet** 내각 sets policy and runs the government ministries under the **Premier** 내각총리 who appoints the rest of the cabinet, but he and the cabinet can be replaced at any time

National Military Commission

- ❖ 국방위원회 under Kim Jong Il was actually the most powerful organ of state, and the **Chairman of the National Military Commission**
 - ❖ is constitutionally the “supreme leader” 최고령도자 of the DPRK since 2009 amendment to constitution.
 - ❖ Selected by the SPA
- ❖ Directly controls:
 - ❖ **State Security Department** 국가안전보위부
 - ❖ **Ministry of People’s Armed Forces** 인민무력부

KWP Party

- ❖ **Top level Party Congress 당대회**
 - ❖ **6th in 1980**
 - ❖ **7th in 2016**

- ❖ **Next level Party Delegates Conference 당대표회의**
 - ❖ **3rd in 2010 Kim Jong Un probably named successor at this time**
 - ❖ **4th in 2012** (Kim Jong Il Enternal General Secretary and Kim Jong Un First Secretary)

- ❖ **Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party 조선로동당 중앙위원회** supposedly guides entire state apparatus, but has been moved to a less prominent position by Kim Jong Il (in most communist countries the **Politburo** 정치국 led by the **Party General Secretary** 총비서 sets party policy. Kim Jong Il is indeed Party Chairman, but the full KWP Central Committee (Plenum) last met in Kim Jong Il in 1994.)
 - ❖ **Plenum in 2010**

Neo-Chuch'e

- ❖ 3rd Party Delegates Conference 2010
 - ❖ First Delegates Conference since 1966, and first since 1980 Sixth Party Conference
 - ❖ Kim Jong Un named successor?
 - ❖ 용명한 동지 →대장
- ❖ Images linking grandfather with grandson in revolutionary lineage

Party Apparatus

- ❖ Kim Jong Il dies December 17, 2011
- ❖ Party under Kim Il Sung
 - ❖ KWP organized in 1946
 - ❖ Monolithic system (suryöngje)=One person final authority in ideology, law, administration, and regulations
 - ❖ In place beginning 1956 and reinforced by 1972 constitution
 - ❖ KWP Politburo transmitted policy to Central Peoples Committee, and the Administrative Council carried them out

Kim Jong Il's Succession

- ❖ Achieved through KWP
 - ❖ First Agitprop Department, then Organization and Guidance Department, and Secretariat by 1973
 - ❖ KJI “party center”
 - ❖ 1980 6th Party Congress—elevated to Presidium of the Politburo and Central Military Commission
- ❖ KJI moved center of power to the Secretariat (which he used as his executive apparatus)
- ❖ Only in 1991 did KJI get appointed to military position—Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces

Party Fades

- ❖ Under Kim Jong Il DPRK
 - ❖ 1996 Kim Il Sung Speech, 로인당 = 송장당 (corpse party) and turned to the military
 - ❖ Kim Jong Il's 1997 succession to Party Secretary bypassed party mechanism
- ❖ 1998 Kim Il Sung Constitution
 - ❖ Kim Il Sung “eternal President”
 - ❖ Economic bureaus of the party abolished
 - ❖ Party centered on ideology

2002 Measures

- ❖ 2001 “Materials exchange markets” among state owned companies
- ❖ 2002 “July 1 Measures to Improve Socialist Economic Administration”
 - ❖ General markets allowed 총합시장, and trading tolerated
- ❖ 2002 Kaesŏng, Sinŭiju, and Kŭmgang SEZ’s formed and added to Najin-Sŏnbong
- ❖ 2003 term “economic reform” 경제개혁 appeared

General Market in P'yŏngyang



2005 Retrenchment

- ❖ Revival of PDS and party economic departments
- ❖ Chang Sǒng-t'aek (Jang Songtaek)
 - ❖ Husband of Kim Jong Il's younger sister Kim Kyǒnghŭi
 - ❖ 2007 given control over State Security, People's Security, Central Prosecutor, Central Court (used to be held by Vice-Chair of Organization and Guidance Department)
- ❖ 2008 Suspension of ROK travel to Kŭmgang Resort
- ❖ 2009 failed “currency reform” [currency exchange]
- ❖ 2010-11— “freeze” ROK property in Kŭmgang and start Chinese tourism

Kim Jong Il's Stroke

- ❖ August 2008 Kim Jong Il had a stroke, but only a few people in the 3rd Floor Secretariat knew
- ❖ Because Kim Jong Il personally approved reports, when these approvals stopped confusion reigned
 - ❖ After KJI recovered and appeared in public (October) he was clearly weak
 - ❖ New purges broke out
- ❖ New Song “Footsteps of the General”
 - ❖ “Footsteps, stomping out vigorous footsteps
 - ❖ All the people of the country following chok chok chok
 - ❖ Propaganda about Comrade General (장군동지). Who?

Kim Jong Un Introduced

- ❖ Posters with “Footsteps” placed everywhere
- ❖ “Young Comrade General Kim Jong Un who continues the Paektu bloodline, the Man’gyōngdae bloodline, the glory of our nation blessed with a general’s uniform, a field marshal’s uniform” written on the “Footsteps” poster


Reinvigorated Party

- ❖ 2009 Kim Jong Un named Vice Minister of the National Security Agency and Vice Chairman of the National Defense Commission
- ❖ 3rd Party Delegates Conference 2010—personal
 - ❖ Kim Kyōnghŭi, Kim Chōng-ŭn, Ch'oe Ryōng-hae
 - ❖ Military
 - ❖ party
- ❖ Politburo—generals and Kim Kyōnghŭi added (Chang Sōng-t'aek an alternate)
- ❖ Secretariat—reinvigorated
- ❖ Central Military Committee—overhauled
- ❖ Organization and Guidance, Propaganda and Agitation, and Care Affairs left the same
 - ❖ (1) formal ranking (pp 38-39)
 - ❖ (2) dispersed leadership
 - ❖ (3) moved military first back to party

KWP

- ❖ Auditing Commission 중앙검사위원회
- ❖ Central Committee 중앙위원회
 - ❖ Politburo (with Standing Committee) 정치국
 - ❖ Secretariat 비서국
 - ❖ Organization and Guidance Office
 - ❖ Propaganda and Agitation Office
 - ❖ Central Control Committee 검열위원회
- ❖ Central Military Commission 중앙군사위원회

Graphic KWP



Kim Jong Un Succession

- ❖ Kim Jong Il died on his personal train on December 17, 2011
 - ❖ Death was only announced two days later
 - ❖ Kim Jong Il laid in state at Kūmsusan Palace December 17th to 29th
 - ❖ Funeral held on the 28th
- ❖ Kim Jong Un named formal successor on December 29th

Under Kim Jong Un

- ❖ 4th Party Delegates Conference (April 2012) and 12th SPA (elected 2009)
 - ❖ Kim Jong Un KWP First Secretary and 1st Chairman of National Defense Commission 당제일비서
 - ❖ Kim Jong Il named “Eternal General Secretary” 조선로동당 영원한 총비서
 - ❖ Constitution amended to make clear that North Korea is a country that possesses nuclear weapons
 - ❖ 2012 the 100th birthday of Kim Il Sung, and DPRK declared a Great and Strong Country 강성대국
- ❖ Gause divides Kim Jong Un’s supporters into 3 groups
 - ❖ Praetorian guard—Ch’oe Ryŏng-hae
 - ❖ Gatekeepers—Chang Sŏng-t’ae
 - ❖ Unitary Guidance (KWP)—O Il-chong

Kim Jong Un Changes

- ❖ March 31, 2013 Plenary Session of Party Central Committee reshuffles the Politburo (raising Pak Pongju), and the Supreme People's Assembly reshuffles the cabinet the next day.
 - ❖ Advance Together line (pyŏngjin nosŏn) announced of advancing economic and nuclear weapons construction together announced.
- ❖ December 12, 2013 Chang Sŏng-t'aek executed (2nd anniversary of Kim Jŏng Il's death)
- ❖ April 2014, 13th SPA elected
- ❖ 2014—Ch'oe Ryŏnghae demoted and then reinstate

2016 Revisions

- ❖ 4th Session of 13th SPA (2014) Constitutional Revision
 - ❖ National Defense Commission 국방위원회 abolished and replaced by State Affairs Commission 국무위원회
 - ❖ Kim Jung Un Chairman of State Affairs
 - ❖ Vice Chairs: (former Army Vice-Marshall) Hwang Pyōngsŏ, Party Central Committee Vice-Chair Ch'oe Ryōnghae, Prime Minister Pak Pongju
 - ❖ “highest leading organ of state policy”

- ❖ Significance?
 - ❖ Makes Kim Jung Un similar in status to the Chinese, US, and South Korean President

- ❖ 7th Party Congress (May 2016)
 - ❖ Position of Party First Secretary abolished and Kim Jung Un named Party Chairman 당위원장
 - ❖ Nuclear policy confirmed and strategy for sprinting to nuclear status formulated

Korea Peoples Army

- ❖ Under Kim Il Sung
 - ❖ Party cells within the army and separate party hierarchy in the military, so KWP party control and KIS control was assured
- ❖ Under Crown Prince Kim Jong Il (1980-1994)
 - ❖ Raised the status of the army, but kept control
 - ❖ Guarantor of national security
 - ❖ Political actor

Guarantor of Security

- ❖ 1.2 million active duty
- ❖ 0.6 million reserves, and 5.7 million paramilitary
 - ❖ 4th largest in the world > US, China, India, DPRK
- ❖ Army 1.02 million
 - ❖ 3500 battle tanks, 560 light tanks
 - ❖ Artillery, multiple rocket launchers
 - ❖ 200,000 well-trained special forces
- ❖ Navy—small vessels for coastal defense, but 70 submarines
- ❖ Air Force—620 planes, of which 69 are advanced

Weapons of Mass Destruction

- ❖ Chemical weapons
 - ❖ Mustard gas, phosgene, sarin, V-agents (nerve gas)
- ❖ Ballistic missiles
 - ❖ 600 scud can hit all of South Korea
 - ❖ 200 Nodong can hit Japan
 - ❖ T'aep'odong may become intercontinental
- ❖ Nuclear devices (six tests beginning in 2006)
 - ❖ Weaponized? Mounted?

KWP versus KPA

- ❖ Started as separate institutions in 1946
- ❖ Party started to take control over military after Korean War, and by 1969 under full control
 - ❖ Senior levels of party and of military fused, however
- ❖ From 1980 military made more autonomous as KJI appointed to (party) Central Military Commission, and later the National Defense Commission (chairman 1993)
- ❖ “military first” (sŏn’gun) from 1995, enshrined in 1998 constitution, and made equal to chuch’e in 2009

KPA 조선인민군

- ❖ (party) Central Military Commission under control of KWP Central Committee from 1962
- ❖ Under Kim Jong Il the National Defense Commission more important
 - ❖ 1972 reported to Central Committee, but 1990 independent
- ❖ KPA important advisor for foreign policy and defense (and SPA majority)

Second Economic Command

- ❖ Established by 5th Party Congress in 1970 to oversee defense industry (제2경제위원회)
 - ❖ Artillery, aviation, naval, missiles, strategic weapons, military communications and logistics
 - ❖ Controls arms import and export (Iran, Cuba, Sudan, Algeria, Pakistan, Syria, Libya, Egypt, UAE)
 - ❖ Controls 150 trading companies
- ❖ Headquartered in Kangdong NE of P'yŏngyang
 - ❖ Concentration of defense industry in Chagang Province
- ❖ Under control of National Defense Commission and Central Military Commission [not directly by the military itself]

“Civilian” Uses of the Military

- ❖ Civil construction (electric plants, apartment blocks)
- ❖ Planting and harvesting when there are labor shortages
- ❖ Mining (8.9% of GDP and 15.9% of exports)
 - ❖ Uranium and coal have significant military involvement

Cummings vrs. Cha

- ❖ Modern monarchy (Cummings), or modernization toward democracy (Cha)?
- ❖ Modernization or convergence theory argues that “objective” factors of development will lead all societies in the long run toward the same system
 - ❖ Urbanization, education and literacy, and markets with propertied class lead to demands for participation = democracy

Arab Spring?

- ❖ Individual socioeconomic development
 - ❖ No growth in GNI per capita since 1990
- ❖ Rates of growth
 - ❖ No “rising spiral of expectations”
- ❖ Demographics
 - ❖ Young literate population, but little idleness
- ❖ Contagion
 - ❖ Small amounts of information leaking in, but not widespread
 - ❖ Foreign broadcasts often jammed, and receivers that can receive them are few (5 TVs per 100 people)
 - ❖ Cell phones and P’yŏngyang University of Science and Technology
 - ❖ marketization
- ❖ Regime type